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Abstract. An idea attributable to Russell serves to extend Zermelo’s theory of systems
of inﬁnitely long propositions to inﬁnitary relations. Speciﬁcally, relations over a given
domain D of individuals will now be identiﬁed with propositions over an auxiliary domain
D∗ subsuming D. Three applications of the resulting theory of inﬁnitary relations are
presented. First, it is used to reconstruct Zermelo’s original theory of urelements and sets
in a manner that achieves most, if not all, of his early aims. Second, the new account
of inﬁnitary relations makes possible a concise characterization of parametric deﬁnability
with respect to a purely relational structure. Finally, based on his foundational philosophy
of the primacy of the inﬁnite, Zermelo rejected Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem; it
is shown that the new theory of inﬁnitary relations can be brought to bear, positively, in
that connection as well.
Keywords: Deﬁnable set, Incompleteness Theorem for Peano Arithmetic, Inﬁnitary rela-
tion, Russell’s substitutional theory, Zermelo set theory.
1. Introduction
Zermelo is widely recognized for having introduced, early in his career, per-
suasive axioms describing the realm of urelements and sets that had been
investigated by Cantor and Dedekind. Quite unrecognized, in contrast, is
Zermelo’s theory of inﬁnitely long propositions, the focus of three papers
published at the end of his career. The latter theory, like the axiomatiza-
tion, was to make a diﬀerence for the foundations of mathematics, as Zermelo
saw things. That said, Zermelo is in need, in both contexts, of a theory of
relations but, in fact, has no such theory, early or late. This deﬁciency is
one we seek to remedy in this paper. Moreover, we shall accomplish this in
a manner that, perhaps surprisingly, uniﬁes Zermelo’s contributions, early
and late, to the foundations of mathematics. The enabling element here will
be an idea, due to Russell, that we will now describe brieﬂy.
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Russell’s ultimate solution to the paradoxes was the ramiﬁed theory of
types of Principia. Along the way, however, he considered, and soon re-
jected, other ideas, among them a nominalistic theory known in the litera-
ture as the “substitutional theory” (see [10]). Russell’s goal was to get the
eﬀect of classes or concepts while working exclusively with propositions and
their constituents. (Russell held that Socrates, the man, is a constituent of
the proposition that Socrates is mortal.) Where a is Socrates and p is the
proposition that Socrates is mortal, Russell writes “p/a; b” for the result
of substituting b for constituent a within p. So “b ∈ {x | x is mortal}”
then asserts only that proposition p/a; b is true. While it may be use-
ful heuristically to regard nondenoting complex “p/a” as a name for the
class of mortals, the mortality concept, or the propositional function “x is
mortal,” Russell’s theory posits no such entities and is variable-free, as he
noted.
We shall draw inspiration, and substance, from Russell’s substitutional
theory as we proceed to extend Zermelo’s theory of inﬁnitely long propo-
sitions, described in Sect. 2, to a theory of inﬁnitary relations, set out in
Sect. 3. Three applications of the new theory then follow. First, in Sect. 4,
it is used to reconstruct Zermelo’s early axiomatization of the theory of ure-
lements and sets, wherein an informal notion of “deﬁnite property” ﬁgures
prominently and problematically. Second, a concise characterization of para-
metric deﬁnability with respect to a purely relational structure is presented
in Sect. 5, after which we turn our attention to arithmetic.
The fresh account of relations yields an alternate description, in Sect. 6,
of the set of inﬁnitely long propositions that are expressible in the lan-
guage of ﬁrst-order Peano arithmetic. That then leads to a third application
of our theory, in Sect. 7, where it is argued that said set of propositions
constitutes the appropriate context in which to assess the signiﬁcance, for
inﬁnitary logic, of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Our argument
is oﬀered as a corrective in light of Zermelo’s unhappy framing of that
result.
Zermelo’s theory of inﬁnitely long propositions is variable-free, and we
follow him, and Russell, in this regard as we extend that theory to relations.
Others have sought to develop mathematical logic in the absence of variables
(see [12] and the literature regarding combinators). Even a fervent believer
in variables may ask, Can a theory of relations manage without them? As
Russell showed, the answer is yes: Variables themselves are not essential,
whereas some notion of substitution is key.
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2. Zermelo’s Systems of Infinitely Long Propositions
We let a1, a2, . . . (or a, b, c, . . .) be arbitrary elements of nonempty domain
D = {a, b, c, . . .}. (Thus a, b, c . . . are particular domain individuals, whereas
a, b, . . . are generic individuals.) We let catalogue K (“kappa”) be p-tuple
〈R1, . . . , Rp〉, where p ≥ 1 and fundamental predicate R with 1 ≤  ≤ p is
n-adic with ﬁnite degree n ≥ 0. We emphasize that R is not a predicate
symbol but, rather, an abstract, degree-and-order-indicating concept or re-
lation analogous to “is a line,” “is a point,” and “lies between” in informal
expositions of plane geometry.
Zermelo base GD,K is the set of all atomic propositions over domain D
and catalogue K. For example, proposition Rab is in GD,K if a, b ∈ D and
dyadic R is a member of K. Domain elements a and b, as well as R, are con-
stituents of Rab, and the former are understood to be intrinsically ordered
within it—ﬁrst a and then b.
Zermelo system HD,K is the well-founded hierarchy built up from GD,K
by closing under negation and inﬁnitary disjunction (see [19]). Speciﬁcally,





2 if ζ = 0
2ψ(ξ) if ζ = ξ + 1
⋃
ξ<ζ ψ(ξ) otherwise,





GD,K if α = 0
{¬A | A ∈ Pβ} ∪ {
∨





α inOn Pα is the Zermelo system comprising all propositions
over domain D and catalogue K. We write A ∨ B or B ∨ A indiﬀerently for
∨{A,B} and identify ∨{A} with A so that HD,K constitutes a cumulative
hierarchy. Conjunction
∧
J is deﬁned as ¬∨{¬B | B ∈ J}.
If A ∈ HD,K is ¬B, then B is an immediate subproposition of A. If A is∨
J , then each member of J is an immediate subproposition of A. A set of
propositions is said to be transitive if it is closed under the immediate sub-
proposition relation. We then write subprop(A) for the smallest transitive
set containing A so that subprop(A) = {A} if A is in GD,K.
With A ∈ HD,K we set rank(A) =:
⋃{
rank(B) + 1 | B ∈ subprop(A) \
{A}}. Empty disjunction ⊥ and any member of GD,K are then of rank 0,
and empty conjunction  is of rank 1.
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Since HD,K is as big as the class of all ordinals, we shall emphasize an
unbounded sequence of limited perspectives. Thus, the (strongly) inacces-
sible initial segment HθD,K =:
⋃
α<θ Pα = Pθ of system HD,K will be the
Zermelo logic of characteristic θ over D and K. Any logic strictly above
HωD,K contains propositions of inﬁnite length. (Like Zermelo, we count ω as
the least inaccessible.) On the other hand, if propositions are represented as
rooted trees with interior nodes labeled by ¬ and ∨, then any proposition
is well-founded in the sense that all paths are ﬁnite. Ensuing deﬁnitions and
theorems will presuppose nonempty domain D, catalogue K = 〈R1, . . . , Rp〉
with p ≥ 1, and, as structural parameter, some ﬁxed inaccessible θ. Accord-
ingly, one can easily prove the fundamental claim formulated neatly as
Theorem 2.1. If J ⊆ HθD,K, then
∨
J ∈ HθD,K if and only if |J | < θ.
We write D
n
2 for the set of all n-ary Boolean-valued functions with
arguments in D. In particular, Id(2)D ∈ D
2
2 is the binary function map-
ping (a, b) ∈ D2 to 1 just in case a = b. We let Tn1,...,npD (or T
nD) denote
Dn12 × · · · × Dnp2.









nD. Then we deﬁne the semantic value val(A,M) of A in M as follows:
1. if A is atomic Ra1 . . . an with 1 ≤  ≤ p and a1, . . . , an ∈ D, then
val(A,M) = true if f (n) (a1, . . . , an) = 1 and val(A,M) = false oth-
erwise
2. if A is ¬B with B ∈ HθD,K, then we have that val(A,M) = true if and
only if val(B,M) = false
3. if A is ∨J , where J ⊆ HθD,K with |J | < θ, then val(A,M) = true if
and only if val(B,M) = true for some B ∈ J .
(We identify truth-values false and true with subsets of {( )}.)
We write M |= A, and say that model M satisfies proposition A, if
val(A,M) = true. We set Mod(A) =: {M ∈ T
nD | M |= A} and, with
J ⊆ HθD,K, we let Mod(J) =:
⋂{Mod(B) | B ∈ J}. (Hence Mod(∅) = T
nD.)
Proposition A ∈ HθD,K is a semantic consequence of J ⊆ HθD,K if Mod(J) ⊆
Mod(A). Propositions A,B ∈ HθD,K are equivalent if Mod(A) = Mod(B).
We write K≡ for identity catalogue 〈R1, . . . , Rp, I〉 such that proposi-
tion Iab, for which we write a ≡ b, has semantic value true in arbitrary
M =: 〈f (n1)1 , . . . , f (np)p , Id(2)D
〉














. As in the case
of Deﬁnition 2.2, we shall regularly omit explicit consideration of identity
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catalogues. When talk of ≡ arises, the reader should understand an identity
catalogue and obvious extensions of deﬁnitions.
The theory of systems of inﬁnitary relations presented below, like the
theory of systems of inﬁnitely long propositions that it extends, assumes
ordinal numbers and transﬁnite induction over them. We take the view that
Cantor’s ordinal numbers constitute an autonomous domain: They are not
to be identiﬁed with sets but, rather, are merely represented by them. This
seems to coincide with the view of Zermelo, late in his career, who urged
“the existence of an unbounded sequence of [strongly inaccessible cardinals]
as a new axiom for the metatheory of sets” ([18, p. 429]; see also [20, p. 591]
for an analogous, if elliptical, remark). Incidentally, Zermelo’s remark by
itself implies no more than an ω-sequence of inaccessibles. In contrast, the
stronger assumption known as “Tarski’s Axiom of Inaccessibles” immedi-
ately yields, within any model of (ﬁrst- or second-order) ZF plus the axiom,
a transﬁnite, strictly increasing sequence of inaccessibles, one for each ordi-
nal of the model.
3. A Substitutional Theory of Infinitary Relations
We next show how a domain-dependent notion of inﬁnitary relation can be
derived from Zermelo’s domain-dependent characterization of inﬁnitely long
propositions as just described. To that end, we let auxiliary domain D∗ be
disjoint union D unionsq θ so that D  D∗ and |D∗ \ D| = θ. (Note that D and
θ together ﬁx D∗ and that, possibly, θ ≤ |D| ≤ |D∗|.) Auxiliary (Zermelo)
logic HθD∗,K will then be the hierarchy of “auxiliary propositions” built up
from Zermelo base GD∗,K, as in Sect. 2. Auxiliary logic HθD∗,K, more properly
its domain D∗, will possess a new, important feature, however.
Namely, we shall assume a well-ordered linearization (a∗β)β<θ of D
∗ \ D.
(We thereby invoke Global Choice.) We write ≺ for said ordering so that
a∗0 ≺ a∗1 ≺ a∗2 ≺ . . .. We write a∗, b∗, . . . and the like for generic mem-
bers of D∗. (Again, neither the terms of (a∗β)β<θ nor a
∗, b∗, . . . are symbolic
constants; rather, they indicate members of D∗ \ D, respectively D∗.)
As described below, propositions of auxiliary logic HθD∗,K will do the work
of level-1 relations over D and K. (The relata of level-1 relations, in a sense
suggested by that of Frege, are members of a ﬁxed domain of individuals—
ground domain D, in the present instance.) Members of D∗ \ D ﬁguring in
propositions of HθD∗,K will constitute “unsaturated positions” available for
uniform replacement by elements of D∗, in particular, by elements of D.
By a (simultaneous) substitution we shall mean any function s : D∗ → D∗
ﬁxing all elements of D. Given A∗ ∈ HθD∗,K and substitution s, we deﬁne
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substitution instance s(A∗) of A∗ inductively. If A∗ is atomic Ra∗1 . . . a∗n ,
then s(A∗) is Rs(a∗1) . . . s(a∗n). If A∗ is ¬B∗ with B∗ ∈ HθD∗,K, then s(A∗)
is ¬s(B∗). If A∗ is ∨J with J ⊆ HθD∗,K satisfying |J | < θ, then s(A∗) is
disjunction
∨{s(B∗) | B∗ ∈ J}. In general, substitution instance s(A∗) of
A∗ ∈ HθD∗,K is a proposition of HθD∗,K. Should s(A∗) be in HθD,K, we speak
of a fully saturated substitution instance of A∗.
Where A∗ ∈ HθD∗,K, we let SA∗ be the set of all fully saturated substi-
tution instances of A∗, all of which are of one and the same rank within
HθD,K, as shown by an easy inductive argument. (Two arbitrary members
of SA∗ will, in general, be nonequivalent, however.) If, to take the simplest
example, Ra∗1 . . . a
∗
n
and Rb∗1 . . . b
∗
n
are members of GD∗,K such that both
(1) a∗i is a
∗




j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and (2) a∗i ∈ D or b∗i ∈ D
implies that a∗i is b
∗
i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then SRa∗1 ...a∗n = SRb∗1 ...b∗n . (Thus
Ra
∗
1 . . . a
∗
n
and Rb∗1 . . . b
∗
n
are “uniﬁable” in a well-known sense.)
With A∗,B∗ ∈ HθD∗,K let us write A∗  B∗ (verbalized as “A∗ and B∗
are similar”) whenever SA∗ = SB∗ . A ﬁrst idea would be to identify relations
over D and K with equivalence classes modulo . However, ﬁxing the degree
of relations, so construed, turns out to require daunting machinery. We shall
do something simpler and yet similarly nominalistic in spirit.
Namely, propositions of HθD∗,K will themselves serve as relations over D
and K. This has, as a mildly jarring consequence, that two distinct, albeit
similar, auxiliary propositions qua relations will do the very same work, so to
speak. (This excess is an artefact, in a sense, of Russell’s theory also.) In any
case, we write ΓθD,K =: HθD∗,K for the class of all relations of characteristic θ
over D and K. Constituents of A∗ in ΓθD,K that happen to be members of D
are termed parameters of A∗. (Constituents in D∗ \ D are nonparametric.)
Fixing the ordinal degree of relation A∗ in ΓθD,K is easy. First, let npconst
(A∗) be the set of all members of D∗ \ D that are (nonparametric)
constituents of A∗. We then set deg[A∗] equal to the order-type of the se-










If deg[A∗] = λ, then we say that A∗ is λ-adic. We have ‖deg[A∗]‖ =
|npconst(A∗)|, although deg[A∗] ≥ |npconst(A∗)| in general. Note that
A∗  B∗ does not imply deg[A∗] = deg[B∗] if the latter are nonﬁnite.









β<deg[A∗] constitutes the sequence of nonparametric
constituents of A∗ as determined by ≺. In the case of atomic Ra∗b∗ with
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a∗, b∗ ∈ D∗\D, we may have aRa∗b∗1 = b∗ and aRa
∗b∗
2 = a
∗ so that the intrin-
sic ordering, within Ra∗b∗, of nonparametric constituents does not coincide
with ≺.
A more familiar notation for relations and their substitution instances
will be useful. This will mean introducing a free-variable-like notation as
an inessential, albeit highly convenient, fac¸on de parler only. Namely, if
deg[A∗] = λ, then we shall frequently write R((πβ)β<λ) ∈ Γλ to express
the membership of A∗, pseudonymously R((πβ)β<λ), in the class of λ-adic
members of ΓθD,K, thereby assuming the entire context provided by D, K,
and θ. If A∗ is of ﬁnite degree n, then we write R(π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Γn, beginning
with index 1 and making corresponding adjustments elsewhere. (See also the
ﬁnal sentence of the preceding paragraph.)
Letting R((πβ)β<λ) be A∗ and with γ < λ and c ∈ D, we shall write either
[[R((πβ)β<λ]](πγ/c) or, more simply, R((πβ)β<γ , c, (πβ)γ<β<λ) for s(A∗),
where substitution s : D∗ → D∗ is deﬁned by writing
s(b∗) =:
{




(Thus the γth nonparametric constituent of A∗, as determined by ≺, is
replaced by c; the result s(A∗) may be of lower degree even if λ is nonﬁnite.)
As limiting case, [[R((πβ)β<λ)]](πβ/cβ)β<λ, or R((cβ)β<λ), where, again,
R((πβ)β<λ) is A∗, will be t(A∗) with substitution t : D∗ → D∗ given by
t(b∗) =:
{
cβ if b∗ is aA
∗
β with β < λ
b∗ otherwise.








metric constituents of A∗ by parameter sequence (cβ)β<λ.) Note that zero-
adic R((cβ)β<λ) is a proposition of Zermelo logic HθD,K. Also, whereas our
notion of substitution itself does not assume ≺, our new notation does.
Three relation-forming operations over ΓθD,K will be of interest. First,
unary operator ∼ will denote relational negation: If R((πβ)β<λ) is A∗, then
we write ∼R((πβ)β<λ) for ¬A∗.
Second, we introduce a disjunction operation on small, indexed families
of relations: If Rι((πβ)β<λι), of degree λι, is A∗ι for each ι in I with |I| < θ,
then we shall write
{Rι((πβ)β<λι) | ι in I} for















≥ max{λι | ι in I}.
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Third, if |D| < θ, then, given  ≥ 1 ﬁnite and m with 1 ≤ m ≤ , we have




R(π1, . . . , πm−1, c, πm+1, . . . , π) ()
will be ( − 1)-adic ∨{sc(A∗) | c in D}, where, for each c in D, substitution
sc : D∗ → D∗ is deﬁned by
sc(b∗) =:
{




We emphasize that, by the likes of Theorem 2.1, () is in Γ−1 just in case
|D| < θ, which we do not assume, as a rule, our purpose being maximum
generality.
In the case of any fully saturated substitution instance of a member of




, uprise,  (the
preceding three deﬁned in terms of ∼ and either  or ), and  (deﬁned
in terms of  and uprise) with proposition-forming ¬, ∨, ∨, ∧, ∧, →, and ↔,
respectively, since said substitution instance is a proposition of Zermelo logic
HθD,K. (We shall see this, in Sect. 4, when we present inﬁnitary formulations
of Zermelo’s axioms for the theory of urelements and sets.)
Relations constructible, in unspeciﬁed manner, over given D and K are
termed “deﬁnite” in [16]. In the context of set theory, involving fundamental
predicates “is an urelement” and “is a member of” only, being green-painted
is not deﬁnite, Zermelo will later write (see [17, p. 363]). This is to under-
score the dependence of the deﬁniteness concept on catalogue K. To clarify
the bounds of deﬁniteness, we introduced a second consideration, namely,
characteristic θ. One can show that any member of ΓθD,K is λ-adic with λ < θ
and that the relational subcomponents of such a relation number fewer than
θ, as do its parameters. So another way a relation may fail to be “deﬁnite,”
as we shall understand this notion, is for it to be too big. Of course, a re-
lation not deﬁnite with respect to θ may be deﬁnite relative to some larger
characteristic, which is to invoke a dialectic featured in [18].
As a ﬁrst application of our account of inﬁnitary relations, we shall show
that it serves as the basis for a compelling reconstruction of Zermelo’s theory
of urelements and sets as ﬁrst presented in [16]. As is well known, deﬁniteness
ﬁgured, problematically, in Zermelo’s Axiom of Separation:
Zermelo’s Theory of Infinitary Propositions 285
Whenever the propositional function G(x) is deﬁnite for all elements of
the set M , M possesses a subset MG containing as elements precisely
those elements x of M for which G(x) is true. ([16, p. 195])
Unfortunately, Zermelo’s antecedent characterization of deﬁniteness assumes
unidentiﬁed construction principles, citing only “laws of logic”:
A question or assertion G is said to be definite if the fundamental
relations of the domain, by means of the axioms and the universally
valid laws of logic, determine without arbitrariness whether it holds
or not. ([16, p. 193]; italics in original)
We shall be supplanting Zermelo’s vague notion of deﬁniteness with the
class Γ1 of monadic relations of characteristic θ over appropriate domain D
and identity catalogue K≡. That, in turn, will obviate the vexed question
whether Zermelo’s 1908 axiomatization, as opposed to its metatheory, is
ﬁrst- or second-order in spirit: If we are right, it is neither.
4. Zermelo Set Theory Reconstructed
Jeder mathematische Satz ist aufzufassen als eine Zusammenfassung von (unendlich
vielen) Elementarsa¨tzen durch Konjunktion, Disjunktion und Negation, und jede
Ableitung eines Satzes aus anderen Sa¨tzen, insbesondere jeder Beweis ist nichts anderes
als eine Umgruppierung der zugrundeliegenden Elementarsa¨tze.
—Ernst Zermelo Thesen u¨ber das Unendliche in der Mathematik (1921)
In presenting axioms for the theory of urelements and sets, Zermelo takes
as his starting point some domain D, ﬁxed at the very outset:
Set theory is concerned with a “domain” D of individuals [Objekte],
which we shall call simply “objects” [Dinge] and among which are the
“sets.” If two symbols a and b denote the same object, we write a ≡ b,
otherwise a ≡ b. We say of an object a that it “exists” if it belongs
to the domain D; likewise we say of a class C of objects that “there
exist objects of the class C” if D contains at least one individual of
this class.
Certain “fundamental relations” of the form a ∈ b obtain between
the objects of the domain D. If for two objects a and b the relation
a ∈ b holds, we say “a is an element of the set b,” “b contains a as an
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element,” or “b possesses the element a.” An object b will be called a
set if and—with a single exception—only if it contains another object
a as an element.
The fundamental relations of our domain D are subject to [certain]
“axioms” or “postulates.” ([16], pp. 191 and 193; italics in original but
symbols changed throughout to match our own discussion)
Zermelo’s opening paragraph indicates that D constitutes part of the subject
matter of set theory. Indeed, as mentioned in [5], two of Zermelo’s seven
axioms make reference to D by name. Our reconstruction will preserve this
domain-speciﬁc feature of Zermelo’s conception.
Reconstructing Zermelo set theory, using the account of deﬁniteness given
in Sect. 3, will mean ﬁrst ﬁxing Zermelo logic HθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉 of inaccessible
characteristic θ, where (1) fundamental predicates RU and R∈ are monadic











〉 |= −ZθD, where −ZθD is the theory described
below. Constraints (2) and (3) together say what it is for D to be combina-
torially feasible modulo θ. (Both concern |D|, as Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 will
show.)








R∈cb ↔ [R∈ca ∧ R(c)]
)]
is an Axiom of Separation, where a is in D and R(π) is any member of
Γ1. Given this reformulation of Separation, Zermelo’s demonstrations, in
[16], that various propositional functions are deﬁnite may now be regarded
as informal, ﬁnitary descriptions of members of Γ1 that are well-founded
albeit, in general, inﬁnitary. Since we can let R(π) be d inC π ≡ d, any
subset C of set a is itself a set (cf. Theorem 5.3); such “domain closure
under set-inclusion” was, most likely, Zermelo’s goal from the start (cf. [18,
p. 403] and [1, p. 12]). We hasten to add that Zermelo’s brief remarks, in
[16], regarding the semantic paradoxes may, but need not, be understood
to deny closure. Should closure under set-inclusion not be Zermelo’s goal,
this would be only a ﬁrst way in which our reconstruction diverges from his
conception.
In this connection, we note that, assuming closure, Choice is a conse-
quence of Sum Set and Separation. That Choice nonetheless ﬁgures among
the seven nonlogical axioms of [16] may then tell against our reconstruc-
tion. And it may not: Even if closure is what he intends, Zermelo may well
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wonder whether he has achieved it, which might, in turn, urge listing of the
crucial axiom as a cautious measure. By the way, Choice was to be picked
up by the underlying logic of Zermelo’s second axiomatization of the theory
of urelements and sets, published in [18], from 1930; but that was not yet
Zermelo’s idea in 1908.
Each of the remaining nonlogical axioms is, in point of fact, the truth-
functional expansion over D (cf. Deﬁnition 6.1) of an axiom of the theory
commonly known as “Z− with urelements,” where Z− is, in turn, the ﬁrst-
order set theory known as Z but without the Axiom of Foundation. (Express-
ing matters in this way is convenient but, of course, utterly anachronistic,
since it is Zermelo’s informal descriptions, in [16], of his axioms that decide













(R∈ca ↔ R∈cb) → a ≡ b
])
,
and Null/Pair Set, Sum Set, Power Set, and Inﬁnity are likewise formulated
in expansione. (We omit Choice.) Finally, as a characterization of urele-










In addition, we assume truth-functional versions of axioms ensuring that
≡ denotes an equivalence relation over D as well as a collection of logical
axioms and rules of inference for HθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉. With respect to the latter,
we can be guided by Karp’s presentation of axioms and rules of inference
for inﬁnitary propositional logic [see [7], pp. 40–41]. It can be shown that
the system SθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉 comprising those axioms and rules of inference
plus distributive laws is strongly complete in the sense that arbitrary A ∈
HθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉 is a semantic consequence of arbitrary J ⊆ HθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉 just in
case A is derivable from J in the system SθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉 plus distributive laws
(see [7, Theorem 5.5.5]). Strong completeness then yields θ-compactness,
since the length of any proof must be less than θ.
Of course, of greatest interest in the present context is the case where J ,
in the preceding paragraph, is −ZθD, and this leads us to an important re-
mark: Although we have written, to this point, of theory −ZθD in the singular,
our reconstruction of Zermelo’s theory of urelements and sets comprises, in
truth, an entire range of theories −ZθD—one, and only one, for each D that
is combinatorially feasible modulo θ. Regarding the latter notion, one can,
assuming Choice, prove
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Theorem 4.1. A set D is a combinatorially feasible domain of “urelements”
and “sets” in the sense of (2) and (3) provided that |D| = λ(n) < θ for
some limit ordinal λ > ω and some cardinal number n.
Zermelo, in [16], does not assume the Axiom of Foundation; consequently,
we have not done so. Theorem 4.1 can be strengthened if we do assume Foun-









〉 ∈ T1,2,≡D satisfying ZθD,” where ZθD incorporates Founda-
tion in expansione. Again assuming the Axiom of Choice in the metatheory,
one can give a concise characterization of feasibility, in the new sense, by
proving
Theorem 4.2. A set D is a combinatorially feasible domain of “urelements”
and “sets” in the sense of (2) and (3 ′) just in case |D| = λ(n) < θ for some
limit ordinal λ > ω and some cardinal number n.
The size of any feasible D, in the new sense, is given either by a singular
cardinal or by a strongly inaccessible cardinal greater than ω.
We have taken feasibility as a starting point; without it, typical −ZθD—for
example, take D with |D| < ω2(n) with n ﬁnite—is unsatisﬁable and, hence,
inconsistent by the completeness of SθD,〈RU ,R∈,I〉. On the other hand, re-
quiring feasibility appears to undermine our reconstruction, given Zermelo’s
high expectations regarding foundations: Any determination of which do-
mains are feasible requires set theory. (The proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2
involve also transﬁnite recursion, and hence Replacement, as well as either
the assumption that domain D is a set or that inaccessible θ exists.) How
does set theory provide a foundation for mathematics if its characterization
assumes a model of a yet stronger theory? We put this vital issue to one side,
momentarily, in order to ﬁrst make the ultimate case for our reconstruction.
Incidentally, Replacement is implicit in Zermelo’s use of transﬁnite induc-
tion in [16], as he himself acknowledges in a 1921 letter to Fraenkel (see [2,
p. 137]); accordingly, Replacement was assumed in Sect. 2 at several points.
Zermelo writes within a philosophical tradition that hearkens back, by
way of Husserl, to Bolzano’s nonlinguistic conception of mathematical the-
ories as systems of abstract propositions or Sa¨tze an sich. Consequently,
Zermelo must see the text of [16] as standing in for something, and the ques-
tion then becomes, Standing in for what? Likely, Zermelo never answered
this question satisfactorily for himself, although Skolem’s eventual answer,
namely, “ﬁrst-order Z− with urelements,” can be excluded out of hand as a
reading of Zermelo’s intentions (see below). Our reconstruction provides an
answer to this question that achieves most, if not all, of Zermelo’s early aims
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with respect to set theory. If correct, it clariﬁes what underlies the infor-
mal presentation of [16], what Zermelo’s symbol-laden German sentences are
vernacular surrogates for. Collectively, theories −ZθD constitute the rightful
axiomatization of Zermelo’s 1908 theory of urelements and sets, or so we
claim. As for relations, Zermelo clearly recognizes the need for them—thus
his talk of “deﬁnite propositional functions”—but seems to hope that he can
avoid any theory of relations.
Regarding the essential character of our reconstruction, it should strike no
one as odd that inﬁnitary logic, central to Zermelo’s foundational philosophy
late in his career, is here being used to clarify even his earliest ideas: When
Zermelo, in his early defense of impredicativity, wrote that “every object
[Gegenstand ] can be determined in a wide variety of ways” ([15, p. 139]), he
cannot have intended ﬁnitary determinations exclusively. (How could each
and every real be determinable in such a manner?) Not so many years later,
Zermelo came to write that “every genuinely mathematical proposition is
to be considered a collection of inﬁnitely many elementary propositions by
means of conjunction, disjunction, and negation” and that, in particular,
“the axioms of every mathematical theory must be inﬁnitary” ([22, p. 307]).
It seems likely that Zermelo held some such view already in the period
around 1908.
Signiﬁcantly, [16] manages to avoid any suggestion of strictly ﬁnitary
logic. We read in Skolem’s [11] from 1922, written in an attempt to clarify
Zermelo’s idea, that a deﬁnite proposition will now be a “ﬁnite expres-
sion” (endlicher Ausdruck) constructed from elementary propositions by
ﬁnite iteration (endlich viele Anwendungen) of standard truth-functional
and quantiﬁcational operations. In marked contrast, the adjective endlich
is not introduced by Zermelo in his remarks, from 1908, concerning deﬁ-
niteness. This can only be deliberate: The portion of [16] in which the Ax-
iom of Separation is presented itself contains references to “ultraﬁnite para-
doxes,” “deﬁnability by means of a ﬁnite number of words,” and the “para-
dox of ﬁnite denotation,” so that the distinction ﬁnite/inﬁnite is close at
hand.
This encourages us to believe that, in 1908, Zermelo consciously shunned
the words “ﬁnite” and “inﬁnite” in connection with deﬁniteness. To be sure,
Zermelo’s [17] from 1929, wherein ﬁnite iteration of logical operations is
invoked, reads very diﬀerently—doubtless the result of Skolem’s inﬂuence.
However, our present goal is a reconstruction of Zermelo’s initial 1908 axiom-
atization as presented in [16], written well before Skolem enters the picture
and well before Skolem in eﬀect causes Zermelo, at least through the twen-
ties, to retreat from his initial, inﬁnitary conception of the logic of mathe-
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matics. (What will, soon enough, jolt Zermelo back to his earlier convictions
is the shock of Go¨del incompleteness [see Sect. 7 below].)
As Zermelo sees things, any mathematical discipline is characterized by a
notion of deﬁniteness: Certain “fundamental relations” are explicitly given
and more complex relations are then constructed by means of logical oper-
ations. Zermelo neglects to indicate, in [16], how far one is permitted to go
in iterating these logical operations, and our assumption of characteristic θ
clariﬁes that one issue. Zermelo’s own reluctance here surely stems from his
desire that deﬁniteness be a notion devoid of any and all set-theoretic pre-
suppositions. Of course, it is no such thing, at least if our ordinal-theoretic
account of inﬁnitary relations is to serve, and there is a problem. What, one
wonders, can the foundational status of any −ZθD be, given that an ordinal-
theoretic notion of a relation has been used to specify a family of Separation
Axioms? (What was said above regarding the requirement of combinatorial
feasibility gives rise to much the same sort of question, but we shall restrict
our discussion to relations.)
We begin by recalling the situation that arises whenever one describes
the syntax of the language of a given formal or semiformal theory. Namely,
inductive deﬁnitions of a variety of notions, e.g., “term,” “formula,” and
“free variable,” are presented. Typically, such deﬁnitions involve (implicit)
iteration through the natural numbers only. Exceptions do occur, however,
as in the case of inﬁnitary logics, which may permit quantiﬁer sequences, say,
of uncountable length. The grammars of all such languages are inherently
ordinal-theoretic, and this is no less true when the language in question is
that of set theory. Set-theoretic notions play a role in any account of what
qualiﬁes as a well-formed formula; hence they ﬁgure in any determination
of which formulæ are instances of axiom schemata. (There are type- and
category-theoretic accounts of logic in which ordinals play no role, but they
need not concern us.)
The situation—whereby an ordinal-theoretic notion of a relation has a
determinative role within Zermelo set theory, reconstructed as a range of
theories −ZθD—is of a piece with the situation, just described, whereby
ordinal-theoretic notions ﬁgure in the speciﬁcation of formal theories gen-
erally. This sort of thing is not what Zermelo envisioned at the beginning
of his career (see [13, Sect. 2]). However, it is a phenomenon that had won
general acceptance not many years later. Set theories qua foundations elu-
cidate the (interim) starting points of mathematics and make for universal
modeling possibilities. They do not provide Cartesian certainty, however,
and may themselves require ancillary support in the guise of something akin
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to Tarski’s Axiom, say. Accordingly, we claim only that the proposed range
of theories −ZθD realizes most, but not all, of Zermelo’s early goals.
That said, why not formulate Zermelo’s axioms using logic Lωθ or the
like? Our answer is this: Since quantiﬁers in the sense of Frege or Russell are
not what is suggested by Zermelo’s invocation of “conjunction, disjunction,
and negation,” cited a few paragraphs back, any such reconstruction would
probably violate Zermelo’s conception. Likewise, the generalization and in-
stantiation rules associated with Lωθ are not compatible with Zermelo’s
added remark that “every deduction and every proof is nothing but a re-
grouping of the underlying elementary propositions” (see again [22, p. 307]).
This is to take [22] very seriously; but there is every reason to do that, given
what came later. As for his earlier publications, since Zermelo introduces no
logical constants whatsoever in [16], always writing the German equivalents
of “for all” and “there exists” to indicate generality, it is not obvious that
the view expressed in [22], from 1921, was not already Zermelo’s view in
1908. Moreover, the cited remark (“determined in a wide variety of ways”)
from [15], also from 1908, probably means that this was his early view.
When Zermelo does, at the end of his career, introduce logical “quantiﬁca-
tion” and notation for it, he states explicitly that he intends domain-wide
conjunctions and disjunctions (see [19, p. 545]).
We shift from set theory to model theory. A central task of any model
theory is to say which subsets of given domain D—more generally, which
subsets of the set Dλ of all λ-tuples of members of D—are deﬁnable relative
to a given relational structure over D. We take up deﬁnability next and note
the importance of not assuming, generally, that |D| < θ. If we were to assume
that, then the notion of parametric deﬁnability would be rendered trivial in
the presence of identity, every domain subset being deﬁnable modulo any
D-structure whatsoever (cf. Corollary 5.4). An alternative course of interest
assumes |D| < θ but considers nonidentity catalogues only.
5. Definability
Again, we set D∗ =: Dunionsqθ with θ strongly inaccessible and assume both Zer-
melo logic HθD,K and auxiliary Zermelo logic HθD∗,K sharing catalogue K =:
〈R1, . . . , Rp〉. Also, where deg[A∗] = λ, we continue to write R((πβ)β<λ) ∈
Γλ to express the membership of relation A∗ in the class of λ-adic members
of ΓθD,K, thereby assuming context D, K, and θ.
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We begin by deﬁning the extension R((πβ)β<λ)M, relative to given model
M =: 〈f (n1)1 , . . . , f (np)p
〉
, of λ-adic relation R((πβ)β<λ).
Definition 5.1. Let R((πβ)β<λ) ∈ Γλ with λ < θ. Then we deﬁne the









If λ = 0, then R((πβ)β<λ)M is one of two subsets of D0 = {( )}, identiﬁed
with ⊥M = ∅ = false and M = {( )} = true. We write CM for the set
of extensions, modulo ﬁxed M ∈ T
nD, of members of C ⊆ ΓθD,K. If C is
ΓθD,K (or Γλ), we write Γ
M (or ΓMλ ) for C
M. Finally, this is a good place
to note that, due to the ≺-dependence of our variable-like notion, from
R((πβ)β<λ) =: A∗ and S((ρβ)β<λ) =: B∗ with A∗  B∗ it does not follow
that R((πβ)β<λ)M = S((ρβ)β<λ)M; what does follow is that R((πβ)β<λ)M
can be obtained from S((ρβ)β<λ)M by uniform permutation of the latter’s
λ-tuple elements (see p. 7).
Definition 5.2. Where A ⊆ D, we say that C ⊆ Dλ is A-definable modulo
M ∈ T
nD if there exists R((πβ)β<λ) ∈ Γλ with parameters in A such that
C = R((πβ)β<λ)M.
Theorem 5.3. Let A ⊆ D and, with λ < θ, let C ⊆ Aλ satisfy |C| < θ.
Then C is A-definable modulo arbitrary M ∈ T
n,≡D .









Identifying a ∈ D with (a) ∈ D1, we then have
Corollary 5.4. Let A be an arbitrary subset of D with |A| < θ. Then A
is A-definable modulo arbitrary M ∈ T
n,≡D .
By Theorem 5.3, given domain D and catalogue K≡, the members of ΓMλ
for arbitrary M ∈ T
n,≡D include any small subset of Dλ. By closure of ΓMλ
under complementation and sum sets of small families, any co-small subset
of Dλ is in ΓMλ as is the sum set of any small family of small and co-small
subsets. Converses of Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.4 require the assumption
that |D| < θ but then hold trivially. (The converse of Corollary 5.4 is in-
compatible with |D| ≥ θ, since D = D1 is ∅- and hence D-deﬁnable by dint
of monadic a∗0 ≡ a∗0.)
In general, not every subset of Dλ is deﬁnable modulo M ∈ T
nD. On the
other hand, Theorem 5.3 shows that, in the case of an identity catalogue,
every small C ⊆ Aλ ⊆ Dλ is A-deﬁnable modulo arbitrary M ∈ T
n,≡D .
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An intermediate state of aﬀairs is possible as well. Namely, assuming that
nonidentity catalogue K contains a nonmonadic element, that is, an element
Rn with n > 1, one can show that, although not every small C ⊆ Aλ is
A-deﬁnable modulo arbitrary M ∈ T
nD, there does exist M′ ∈ T
nD such that
every small C ⊆ Aλ is indeed A-deﬁnable modulo M′.
As noted earlier, any B∗ in HθD∗,K involves fewer than θ parameters. So
if relaion B∗ is of degree λ < θ, then we may regard the extension, modulo
M ∈ T
nD, of B∗ as an A-deﬁnable subset of Dλ, relative to M, where A is
the set comprising all and only the parameters of B∗. (Deﬁnition 5.2 itself
places no such restriction on A ⊆ D.) Accordingly, we shall refer to ΓMλ
with λ < θ as the collection of subsets of Dλ (set-)parametrically definable
modulo M, and {ΓMλ }λ<θ, in turn, is the hull of model M.
Taking the analysis of ﬁnite deﬁnability put forward in [6] as prototype,
we shall present, in Theorems 5.5 and 5.6 below, a succinct characteriza-
tion of {ΓMλ }λ<θ, beginning with the ∅-deﬁnables. Said characterization will
be notable by virtue of its making no appeal to the notion of satisfaction
in M.
A ﬁrst, preliminary goal is to deﬁne a binary collapse operation applica-
ble to distinguished D-sequences. We say that ordinal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ ,
assumed to be nonempty and strictly increasing, is μ-bounded if ξγ < μ for
all γ < μ′ ≤ μ. Further, if ordinal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ is μ-bounded and D-
sequence (aβ)β<μ is such that aξγ = aξδ for arbitrary γ, δ < μ
′, then we say
that (aβ)β<μ is [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-identical. (By extension, we shall say that C ⊆ Dμ
is [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-identical provided that each of its members is.)
The needed collapse operation can now be deﬁned. Namely, if (1) ordi-
nal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ is μ-bounded, (2) D-sequence (aβ)β<μ is [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-
identical, and (3) otp
[








will denote the λ-sequence that is the result of eliminating from (aβ)β<μ all
but the ﬁrst term (“0 < γ”) of identical subsequence (aξγ )γ<μ′ . (Note that
if μ′ = 1, then () is ﬁrst operand (aβ)β<μ itself.)
Next, we shall need a notion of inﬁmum for inﬁnite sequences of sets
of progressively collapsing, yet never vanishing, D-sequences. If ordinal se-
quence (ξγ)γ<μ′ is μ-bounded, then (aγ)γ<μ′ ∈ Dμ′ is said to be
the [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-subsequence of (bδ)δ<μ ∈ Dμ provided that aγ = bξγ for all
γ < μ′. Further, sequence σ ∈ Dμ′ is a (nonempty) subsequence of se-
quence τ ∈ Dμ, and we write σ  τ , if σ is the [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-subsequence of τ
for some μ-bounded ordinal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ . If (σξ)ξ<ζ is a sequence of
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D-sequences such that, for all γ < δ < ζ, we have σδ  σγ , then we write
infξ<ζ σξ for the longest D-sequence τ such that τ σξ for all ξ < ζ. (If ζ is a
[nonzero] limit ordinal, then this “sequential inﬁmum” exists by Sum Set and
Separation.)
Given μ-bounded ordinal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ , we say that “S ⊆ Dμ extends
S′ ⊆ Dμ′ pointwise with respect to (ξγ)γ<μ′ ,” and write S′ (ξγ)γ<μ′ S,
provided that there exists (unique) bijection h(ξγ)γ<μ′ : S
′ → S such that
h(ξγ)γ<μ′ takes (aγ)γ<μ′ ∈ S′ to (bδ)δ<μ ∈ S just in case (aγ)γ<μ′ is the
[(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-subsequence of (bδ)δ<μ. (Hence S′ (ξγ)γ<μ′ S if and only if each
μ′-tuple in S′ is the [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-subsequence of a unique μ-tuple in S and
each μ-tuple in S has a unique μ′-tuple in S′ as [(ξγ)γ<μ′ ]-subsequence.) Set
S ⊆ Dμ uniformly extends S′ ⊆ Dμ′ pointwise with 0 < μ′ ≤ μ, and we write
S′  S, if S′ (ξγ)γ<μ′ S for some μ-bounded ordinal sequence (ξγ)γ<μ′ . The
reader will wish to note that relation  is transitive and that S′  S implies
|S′| = |S|.
Finally, suppose (Sξ)ξ<ζ is a sequence of sets of D-sequences such that
∅ = S0 ⊆ Dμ with μ > 0 and Sδ  Sγ for all γ < δ < ζ < θ. (Thus lengths
of D-sequences neither increase nor vanish as we proceed through (Sξ)ξ<ζ .)
Further, for any γ < δ < ζ, let hγ,δ : Sδ → Sγ designate the bijection
witnessing Sδ  Sγ . Then, where σ ∈ S0, we deﬁne function ϕσ, taking





σ if δ = 0
h−1γ,δ(ϕσ(γ)) if δ = γ + 1
infγ<δ ϕσ(γ) otherwise.













Deﬁnition (∗) presupposes a ζ-sequence of extension-witnessing bijections.
That is no less true of the fourth case at (‡) below, where the bijections
involved are ﬁxed by the collapse operations ﬁguring in that deﬁnition.




ordinal sequences with 0 < ζ < θ. Then we deﬁne, by simultaneous ordinal
recursion, unary functions v : ζ + 1 → μ + 1 and F , whereby F (δ) with
δ < ζ + 1 is a subset of Dv(δ), by writing both









{ξγα | 0 < α < μ′γ}, <)
]
if δ = γ + 1 and both
(ξγα)α<μ′γ is v(γ)-bounded and
F (γ) is [(ξγα)α<μ′γ ]-identical
(henceforth “ holds”)
















(aβ)β<v(γ) ∈ F (γ)
}
if δ = γ + 1 and
 holds
F (γ) if δ = γ + 1 but
 fails to hold
infγ<δ F (γ) otherwise.
(‡)
We are now ready to formulate
Theorem 5.5. Let M =: 〈f (n1)1 , . . . , f (np)p , Id(2)D
〉 ∈ T
n,≡D . Suppose that, for
each λ < θ, we have that Bλ ⊆ ℘(Dλ) and that {Bλ}λ<θ is the smallest
family {Cλ}λ<θ satisfying









]−1(1) is in C2





∣ bγ = bδ
}
in Cλ for any fixed γ < δ < λ
(iii) (Complementation) for arbitrary λ < θ, if A is in Cλ, then so is Dλ \A
(iv) (Sum Sets of Small Families) for arbitrary λ < θ, if each member Aι of
family {Aι}ι in I with |I| < θ is in Cλ, then so is
⋃
ι in I Aι
(v) (Cylindriﬁcation) if A is in Cλ2 with λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = λ < θ, then{
τ1
τ2τ3 ∈ Dλ | τ1 ∈ Dλ1 and τ2 ∈ A and τ3 ∈ Dλ3
}
is in Cλ






, with 0 < ζ < θ fixed, is itself an ordinal
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sequence, then we have that F (δ), as defined at (‡), is in Cv(δ) for all
0 < δ < ζ + 1, where ordinal function v is defined as at (†).
Then Bλ is Def∅λ =: {C ⊆ Dλ | C is ∅-definable modulo M} for each λ < θ.
Proof. Although diﬀering considerably in their details, the structure of the
proof of Theorem 5.5, and that of Theorem 5.6 below, is precisely that of
[9, Proposition 1.3.4].
Preliminary to the characterization of parametric deﬁnability in Theo-
rem 5.6, we deﬁne a ternary interpolation operation that is the inverse,
in a stronger sense, of the collapse operation deﬁned earlier. Suppose that
(ξα)α<μ′ is a μ-bounded sequence of ordinals and let otp
[
(μ \ {ξα | α <
μ′}, <)] = λ. Then, with (aβ)β<λ ∈ Dλ and (bα)α<μ′ ∈ Dμ′ given,
interpolate
[
(aβ)β<λ, (bα)α<μ′ , (ξα)α<μ′
]
is deﬁned to be the sequence (cβ)β<μ ∈ Dμ given by
cβ =:
{
aγ if β is the γth term of ordinal sequence
(
μ \ {ξα | α < μ′}, <
)
bα if β = ξα for some (necessarily unique) α < μ′
for all β < μ. (Thus the terms of sequence (bα)α<μ′ are interpolated, within
sequence (aβ)β<λ, as directed by ordinal sequence (ξα)α<μ′ so as to obtain
a new sequence (cβ)β<μ ∈ Dμ.)
Theorem 5.6. (Hull Construction) Let M ∈ T
n,≡D . Suppose further that,
for each λ < θ, we have that Bλ ⊆ ℘(Dλ) and that {Bλ}λ<θ is the smallest
family {Cλ}λ<θ satisfying (i)–(vi) of Theorem 5.5 as well as
(vii) (Parametrization) if nonempty A is in Cμ with 0 < μ < θ and (ξα)α<μ′
is a μ-bounded sequence of ordinals, then, with “parameter sequence”
(bα)α<μ′ ∈ Dμ′ fixed and λ =: otp
[














Then the family {Bλ}λ<θ is identical with the hull {ΓMλ }λ<θ of model M.
We have succeeded in constructing the “deﬁnable hull” of model M ∈
T
n,≡D without appeal to the satisfaction relation. Absent a theory of in-
ﬁnitary relations, one would be unable to say the ﬁrst thing about deﬁn-
ability in the context of Zermelo’s theory of inﬁnitely long propositions.
That said, Theorems 5.5 and 5.6, formulated for maximum generality, tran-
scend anything Zermelo himself might have envisioned. In particular, since
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the only models he considered were models of mathematical theories, he
routinely assumed that |D| < θ, lest the domain-wide conjunctions and dis-
junctions serving as axioms fail to be propositions of context-furnishing Zer-
melo logics HθD,K. Thus, whereas, in the present section, we have provided
Zermelo with a model theory, in no sense should it be seen as a reconstruc-
tion. Indeed, Zermelo lacks even something so basic as our Deﬁnition 2.2
(cf. [20, p. 593]).
In Sect. 7 we shall oﬀer a ﬁnal application of our variable-free, ordinal-
theoretic account of inﬁnitary relations. The new application will concern
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem, Zermelo’s reaction to it, and philo-
sophical issues concerning the foundations of mathematics. We ﬁrst set the
stage, in Sect. 6, by presenting an equivalence result linking our nonlinguistic
theory of inﬁnitary relations to the language of ﬁrst-order arithmetic.
6. Arithmetic Expressibility and Infinitary Relations
Let N be denumerable set {a0, a1, a2, . . .} and let Ar be identity catalogue
〈R1, R2, R3, I〉, where R1 is dyadic (as suggested by “is the successor of”)
and R2 and R3 are both triadic (as suggested by “is the sum (product)
of . . . and . . . ”). Let LN,Ar be the ﬁrst-order language comprising (1) n-
adic predicate constant R for each fundamental predicate R of Ar as well
as dyadic predicate constant ≡˙ , (2) individual constants 0,1,2, . . . denoting
a0, a1, a2, . . . , respectively, (3) a countably inﬁnite set of individual variables
x1,x2, . . . , (4) connectives ∨˙ and ¬˙ and quantiﬁer ∃, and (5) comma and
parentheses. A term is an individual constant or a variable, and formation
rules are the usual ones. We let n1, n2, . . . and the like stand for generic ele-
ments of N, and n1,n2, . . . will indicate individual constants denoting them.
We write x for variable sequence x1, . . . ,xk and n for constant sequence
n1, . . . ,nk. As usual, Φ(x) is a formula of LN,Ar whose free variables (if any)
are among x1, . . . ,xk, and Φ(n) will be the result of replacing each and every
occurrence of variable xi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, by constant ni throughout Φ(x).
Modulo saturation by individual constants, formulæ of LN,Ar can be as-
sociated, in a natural way, with propositions of Zermelo logic Hθ
N,Ar whereby
θ > ω, as described in
Definition 6.1. Where Φ(x) is a formula of LN,Ar and n1, . . . , nk ∈ N,
we deﬁne the propositional expansion [Φ(n)]+
N
of Φ(x) modulo saturation by
individual constants n as follows:
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1. if Φ(x) is R t1 . . . tn with 1 ≤  ≤ 3, then [Φ(n)]+N is R m1 . . .mn ,
where, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
mi =
{
nj if term ti is variable xj with 1 ≤ j ≤ k
aj if term ti is individual constant j
(∗)
2. if Φ(x) is t1 ≡˙ t2, then [Φ(n)]+N is m1 ≡ m2, where mi with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 is
deﬁned as at (∗)
3. if Φ(x) is ¬˙Ψ(x), where Ψ(x) is a formula of LN,Ar, then [Φ(n)]+N is
¬[Ψ(n)]+
N



















Since θ > ω, we have that [Φ(n)]+
N
∈ Hθ
N,Ar invariably. We set N
∗ =: Nunionsqθ
and assume a well-ordered linearization of N∗ \ N.
Definition 6.2. We say that A ∈ Hθ
N,Ar is (arithmetically) expressible, and
write A ∈ exprN,Ar, provided that A is [Φ(n1, . . . ,nk)]+N for some formula
Φ(x1, . . . ,xk) of LN,Ar and some n1, . . . , nk ∈ N.
Of course, exprN,Ar is a countable subset of uncountable HθN,Ar, which will
be important in Sect. 7.
Our goal in the present section is an alternate, nonlinguistic characteri-
zation of exprN,Ar. To this end, we present
Definition 6.3. The family {Fα}α<ω2 of first-order arithmetical relations
(of finite character) is the smallest family {Gα}α<ω2 satisfying:
1. with 1 ≤  ≤ 3 and a∗1, . . . , a∗n ∈ N∗, relation Ra∗1 . . . a∗n is in G0, as
is a∗1 ≡ a∗2
2. if relation R(π1, . . . , πk) with k ≥ 0 is in Gβ with β < ω2, then we have
that ∼R(π1, . . . , πk) is in Gβ+1
3. if relation R(π1, . . . , πk) is in Gβ1 and relation S(ρ1, . . . , ρ) is in Gβ2
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5. if relation R(π1, . . . , πk) with k ≥ 1 is in Gβ with ω ≤ β < ω2, then ex-
istential generalization

c in N R(π1, . . . , πj−1, c, πj+1, . . . , πk) is in Gβ+1
for any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Thus the members of
⋃
α<ω2 Fα, all of ﬁnite degree, are structurally sim-
ple: They are all and only those “inﬁnitary” relations, over N and Ar, built
up from atomic relations, possibly with parameters in N, by ﬁnitely many
applications of the relation-forming operations deﬁned in Sect. 3.
With α < ω2, we write Gα ⊆ HθN,Ar for the set of fully saturated sub-
stitution instances of members of Fα. Our terminology notwithstanding,
the family {Gα}α<ω2 of fully saturated substitution instances of ﬁrst-order
arithmetical relations of ﬁnite character has been deﬁned without reference
to LN,Ar. As a ﬁnal technical oﬀering, we bring two ideas together in
Theorem 6.4. (Coincidence Theorem)
⋃
α<ω2 Gα = exprN,Ar.
Proof. For one direction, one proves the strengthening: If R(π1, . . . , πk)
is a first-order arithmetical relation of finite character, then there exists a
formula Φ(x1, . . . ,xk) of LN,Ar, unique up to ordering of disjuncts (if any),
in which each of x1, . . . ,xk has at least one free occurrence such that, for
any n1, . . . , nk ∈ N, the fully saturated substitution instance R(n1, . . . , nk)
of R(π1, . . . , πk) is expansion [Φ(n1, . . . ,nk)]+N . The proof proceeds by in-
duction on the complexity of R(π1, . . . , πk).
In the other direction, also, one proves a stronger claim, namely: If
Φ(x1, . . . ,xk) is a formula of LN,Ar and the members of HΦ(
x) ⊆ [1, k]
are all and only the indices of variables among x1, . . . ,xk having free oc-
currences in Φ(x1, . . . ,xk), then there exists first-order arithmetical relation
R(π1, . . . , πj) of finite character, unique up to similarity, and unique bijec-
tion ϑΦ(
x)R(π1,...,πj) : HΦ(
x) → [1, j] such that, for n1, . . . , nk ∈ N arbitrary,













) of R(π1, . . . , πj). The
proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of Φ(x1, . . . ,xk), where the
more challenging subcase is that of disjunction.
Coincidence Theorem 6.4 in hand, we now turn to philosophy. Zermelo
scorned Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem, motivated ultimately by his
own doctrine of the primacy of the inﬁnite in logic and mathematics. More
immediately, Zermelo adduced a simple cardinality argument purportedly
unveiling the triviality of Go¨del’s result (see below). Yet rejection of that
result is, truth be told, no inevitable consequence of Zermelo’s foundational
philosophy. Indeed, Coincidence Theorem 6.4 will be brought to bear so as
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to cast Go¨del’s result in a favorable light, even with respect to the systems
of inﬁnitely long propositions that Zermelo preferred.
7. Incompleteness, Zermelo Logics, and Natural Kinds
Der Mensch tra¨gt vielerlei Mo¨glichkeiten in sich, und je nach der logischen Kette, die er
um die Dinge wirft, kann er sich beweisen, daß sie gut oder schlecht sind.
—Hermann Broch Esch oder die Anarchie
By Peano arithmetic, or PA, we shall mean a well-known theory whose
axioms are formulated in the ﬁrst-order language LN,Ar described in Sect. 6.
Provability in PA is related to Zermelo logic Hθ
N,Ar by way of
Definition 7.1. Proposition A ∈ exprN,Ar ⊆ HθN,Ar is said to be arithmeti-
cally decidable if A is the propositional expansion, modulo saturation, of a
formula of LN,Ar that is either provable or refutable in PA.
Let h be the Go¨del number of formula ¬˙∃x1(proofPA(x1,x2)) of LN,Ar.





of sentence ¬˙∃x1(proofPA(x1,h)) is in exprN,Ar. However, Go¨del showed this
sentence to be neither provable nor refutable in PA, assuming that theory
consistent. Thus we have widely, if not quite universally, celebrated
Theorem 7.2. (Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem) Assuming PA con-
sistent, a member (namely, Ag) of exprN,Ar is arithmetically undecidable.
Is Incompleteness Theorem 7.2 signiﬁcant for Zermelo logics? Not accord-
ing to Zermelo, who argued that Go¨del’s result is unsurprising:
From our point of view, there are no objectively undecidable proposi-
tions. On the other hand, Go¨del has tried to prove the opposite. The
only reason Go¨del’s proof works is because he applies the ﬁnitistic re-
striction only to the provable propositions of the system and not to
all propositions belonging to the system. Thus only the former, but
not the latter, form a countable set, and of course, when understood
in this sense, there must exist undecidable propositions. ([19, p. 547])
Zermelo was unimpressed by Go¨del’s having presented an undecidable propo-
sition. Cardinality is again the issue in a second, and ﬁnal, letter to Go¨del:
You obtain an uncountable system of possible propositions only a
countable subset of which would be provable, and there would cer-
tainly have to exist undecidable propositions. ([21, p. 501])
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The “uncountable system” of which Zermelo writes in both passages
is Russell’s simple theory of types with natural numbers as individuals,
which Go¨del assumed, whereas “countable subset” refers to the collection of
(propositions expressed by) sentences of that theory derivable from Peano’s
axioms. It is convenient, and no great distortion, to translate Zermelo’s re-
marks so as to make them refer to Zermelo logic Hθ
N,Ar, on the one hand, and,
on the other, to the collection of arithmetically decidable propositions in the
sense of Deﬁnition 7.1. Clearly, Hθ
N,Ar, because uncountable, must contain
propositions that are not in the merely countable subset of decidable ones.
Zermelo concludes that Go¨del’s result is redundant, telling us only what we
already knew. However, it is wrong to focus on uncountable Hθ
N,Ar, as does
Zermelo. (That said, as we have reconstrued it, Zermelo’s misstep here is
no mere willfulness: Lacking a theory of relations, what choice, compatible
with his foundational philosophy, does Zermelo have for situating Go¨del’s
result within his own theory of inﬁnitely long propositions?)
Go¨del’s result is advantageously framed within Zermelo’s theory of in-
ﬁnitely long propositions, we would insist, only by identifying an appropri-
ate countable collection of propositions containing undecidable Ag. Further,
such contextualization is ready to hand in the guise of exprN,Ar. Is Incom-
pleteness Theorem 7.2, formulated in terms of countable exprN,Ar, not of
considerable interest, given that cardinality alone does not predict it? Again,
Zermelo, driven now by his doctrine of the primacy of the inﬁnite, must an-
swer no, since, by his lights, exprN,Ar is not a natural collection:
Proceeding from the assumption that it should be possible to rep-
resent all mathematical concepts and theorems by means of a fixed
finite system of signs, we inevitably run into the well-known “Richard
antinomy,” recently resurrected in the form of Skolemism, i.e., the doc-
trine that every mathematical theory can be realized in a countable
model. As is well known, everything can be proved from contradictory
premises; but even the oddest conclusions Skolem and others have
drawn from their basic assumption have apparently not suﬃced to
raise doubts about what has already attained the status of a dogma.
But a healthy “metamathematics” will only become possible once we
have deﬁnitively renounced that “ﬁnitistic prejudice.” Mathematics
is not concerned with “combinations of signs” but with conceptually
ideal relations among the elements of a conceptually posited inﬁnite
manifold. Our systems of signs are but imperfect expedients of our fi-
nite mind, which we employ in order to at least gradually get a hold on
the inﬁnite, which we can neither “survey” nor grasp immediately and
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intuitively. [My goal is] to develop the foundations of a “mathemati-
cal logic” that is free from the “ﬁnitistic prejudice” and that permits
mathematics’ further development without arbitrary prohibitions and
restrictions. ([19, pp. 543, 545]; italics in original)
With respect to present concerns, we take Zermelo’s point here to be the fol-
lowing. Whereas ﬁnitude is a standing feature of human cognition, nonethe-
less, in mathematics, ﬁnitary methods are but stopgap measures. Conse-
quently, exprN,Ar is not a natural collection from the standpoint of math-
ematical science itself, according to Zermelo. This is because the essential
character of exprN,Ar is determined by ﬁnitary language LN,Ar and, hence,
by accidental limitations of the human investigators of said science.
Before presenting our own contrasting view, it will be useful to summarize
Sect. 6. First, exprN,Ar, a countable set of propositions, was deﬁned, linguis-
tically, in terms of propositional expansions of formulæ of language LN,Ar.
Next, the family {Gα}α<ω2 was deﬁned. Our nonlinguistic characterization
of that family made no reference to the language of arithmetic, appealing
only to our nonlinguistic theory of inﬁnitary relations, speciﬁcally to the
relation-forming operations described in Sect. 3. Ultimately, Coincidence
Theorem 6.4 asserted that exprN,Ar is identical with
⋃
α<ω2 Gα. Thus we
have two distinct characterizations—one linguistic and one nonlinguistic—
of one and the same countable set of propositions of Zermelo logic Hθ
N,Ar.
So is exprN,Ar, in the end, a natural collection of propositions? As we see
things, the very existence of two alternate characterizations—only the ﬁrst
of which was available to Zermelo, incidentally—constitutes evidence, pace
Zermelo, that “expressible proposition,” in the sense of Deﬁnition 6.2, is akin
to a natural kind, a notion familiar from the Philosophy of Science. (Three
examples from the world of experience would be “gold, and frankincense, and
myrrh” as opposed to the random contents of Smith’s rental storage locker.)
Meanwhile, Incompleteness Theorem 7.2 tells us something signiﬁcant, and
surprising, concerning the “arithmetically expressible” kind.
As for the worth of our own project, we would pose a ﬁnal question.
Absent a theory of inﬁnitary relations, can one give an alternate characteri-
zation of exprN,Ar like that derived from Deﬁnition 6.3, one that avoids ref-
erence to the language of PA and thereby buttresses our claim that exprN,Ar
is a natural collection? This time around, the answer seems to be no.
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